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In October, 2013, a 24 year-old Eritrean woman, Akberet, one of the survivors, speaking to the Italian 
newspaper La Repubblica narrated 
what had happened on board the 
66ft long boat that capsised half a 
nautical mile off the Italian island of 
Lampadusa. The boat was carrying 450 
to 500 refugees; the majority of them 
were Eritreans. She said “There was 
a panic when a fire broke out on the 
boat – believed to have been started 
when someone lit a blanket to try to 
attract the attention of authorities as 
the vessel lay half a mile ashore. There 
were flames that were destroying the 
boat. We started to scream and then 
jumped into the water. Then I swam 
with all my strength. I saw many people 
die next to me. I thought I would die 
too. I’m just glad to be alive – I’ve 
reached Italy after years of desperation. 
I’m trying to find a better life and safer 
place.” 
In the recent months the world 
was shaken and its moral values were 
questioned when a ship carrying 
more than 900 refugees sank in the 
Mediterranean Sea killing all of them 
but 27. More than 350 of the perished 
refugees are said to be Eritreans. 
At that time a video was broadcast 
showing the so-called ISIS group 
mercilessly executing young Eritreans 
and Ethiopians in Lydia, Turkey. 
Thousands of Eritrean families 
across the country and the diaspora 
are engulfed with sadness and grief not 
only about the death of their young 
ones, but also about their helplessness 
to find closure and bring about lasting 
change in their hellish conditions. 
During his visit to Lampadusa on 
the eve of the tragedy in October 
2013, Pope Francis lamented about 
“the globalisation of indifference”. 
The utter silence and indifference 
exhibited by the Eritrean government 
all this time is indeed a clear admission 
of its responsibility for creating the 
conditions that have driven tens of 
thousands of young Eritreans to misery 
and death. Eritreans are under no 
illusion to expect anything different 
from the government, given its past 
record. They have, however, legitimate 
expectations from their African brothers 
and sisters, especially their continental 
body, the African Union, to stand up 
on their behalf – on the side of justice 
and human dignity. 
The indifference of the African 
Union (AU) is an indictment of the 
institution and of African leaders. Their 
behaviour is in total contradiction of 
the founding principles of the African 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
African Union Constitutive Act, the 
African Charter, the African Peace 
and Security Architecture, and other 
declarations by the AU. The silence is 
The security services moved swiftly and arrested 
13 top army generals and government officials 
and journalists on September 18, 2001. Ever 
since, these officials, all leaders of the liberation 
struggle, remain in prisons in obscure places.
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Politically sensitive picture:- 13 Members of Executive Committee of EPLF 1977–1987. 
Eleven of those in the picture either died in obscure circumstances, still languishing in 
prisons for decades or forced to exile.  
not only a betrayal of the aspirations of 
the people of Africa to live in dignity in 
their own continent and be protected 
everywhere in the world. The silence 
is also a clear statement which 
suggests that the African Union, like its 
predecessor the OAU, and its leaders, 
continue to hide behind the “principle 
of territorial integrity and national 
sovereignty” to avoid the responsibility 
of upholding the sovereignty, rights 
and dignity of the people of Africa. 
As an African it is painful to see a 
contrary reaction by the European 
Union. Soon after the incident was 
reported the European Union held an 
emergency summit where it came up a 
with ten point plan to respond to the 
escalating humanitarian catastrophe at 
its gate. The question about the motive 
for the EU to react to the situation 
is immaterial at this moment. The 
fact that it reacted to the continuing 
tragedy, while the African Union 
appears to be indifferent to the death 
of Africans is very worrying. 
Indeed, the recent tragedies are 
not the first and definitely not the last 
ones. As long as the African Union and 
African leaders do not take concerted 
and decisive actions to pressure the 
dictatorial regime in Asmara, young 
Eritreans will continue to leave their 
country in search of safety. Along the 
way they will continue to perish in their 
numbers. The accounts of survivors of 
the events leading to the sinking of the 
ships they were travelling on indeed 
resemble the current state of Eritrea. It 
is critical that the African Union take 
urgent action to prevent the worst – a 
failed state in the Horn of Africa. 
In order to understand the 
humanitarian catastrophe, it is 
important to look into its root causes. 
This approach is unfortunately ignored 
by the world’s media. 
Liberation Struggle – Betrayed 
Promises
Eritrea gained its independence 
in 1991 after a three-decade war of 
liberation. The national liberation 
struggle was supported by the entire 
population. Self-reliance was the 
fundamental principle that guided the 
struggle which was highly isolated in 
the context of the cold war. To cement 
this principle the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF) established 
broad-based mass organisations both 
within the liberated and semi-liberated 
areas and among Eritrean diaspora 
communities all over the world. Using 
mass organisations as vehicles, the 
EPLF conducted political education 
that contributed to the deepening of 
a national revolutionary consciousness 
among the broad masses of Eritrea. 
Though the revolution was led 
by former students the bulk of the 
membership of the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Army (EPLA) was made up 
of the peasantry. In true articulation 
of the Eritrean people’s aspirations 
the EPLF adopted a series of vision 
documents. The most remarkable one 
was the 1987 political programme in 
which EPLF declared the establishment 
of an inclusive democratic political 
system as its core political objective. 
The programme signified a departure 
from its radical leftist political 
ideology declared in 1977. The 
shift corresponded with the ensuing 
global political trends following from 
rapprochement between the then 
Soviet Union and the United States. 
It was more a response to the growing 
demand from within the rank and 
files of the liberation movement for 
reform. The position was once again 
reiterated by the decision of the 3rd 
and last congress of the movement in 
1994 at which the EPLF transformed 
itself into a party and renamed itself 
the People’s Front for Democracy and 
Justice (PFDJ).  
Pursuant of the resolution of the 3rd 
Congress, a constitution was drafted 
through a largely participatory and 
inclusive process. The constitution was 
ratified in May 1997. Before it could 
be ratified by the president for full 
implementation the border war with 
Ethiopia suddenly erupted. 
There are at least two opposing 
narrations regarding the circumstances 
surrounding the eruption of the war. The 
one narration espoused by a majority 
of Eritreans focused on Ethiopia, in 
particular the Tigrayan political elite 
within the Tigray People Liberation 
Front (TPLF). According to this Eritrean 
narration the latter harboured a long-
standing, ill-intentioned ambition to 
reverse Eritrean independence and 
create a Greater Tigray by annexing all 
Tigrigna speaking peoples and other 
territories of the region. To cement 
their argument the proponents of the 
position refer to the 1976 Political 
Manifesto of TPLF, now the central 
political force within the coalition 
party of the Ethiopian Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Democratic Front, 
a ruling party in Ethiopia. Both the 
internal administrative re-arrangement 
of Ethiopia based on the federal 
constitutional provision which ironically 
permits the right to secession, and the 
incremental encroachment of the local 
Tigrayan militias into Eritrean territories 
since the early period of Eritrean 
independence are mentioned as active 
moves towards the creation of a legal 
and political reality on the ground. Such 
public narrative is a source of a deep-
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seated suspicion towards Ethiopia.  Of 
course, Ethiopians also have their own 
narrative about what the motive could 
have been for the eruption of the war.
Border War with Ethiopia – A Smoke 
Screen?
Whether the above narration is 
true or not, it greatly reignited Eritrean 
nationalism and mobilised Eritreans, 
both inside and outside the country, 
in support of the war. Whether serious 
consideration was given to other political 
options to deal with the border dispute 
besides going to war is a fundamental 
question that still begs an answer. Critics 
suggest that the war was a pretext to 
derail the democratisation process. 
The war consumed more than 
a hundred thousand lives of young 
people on both sides; tens of thousands 
were disabled; and tens of thousands 
of people have been displaced from 
their homes. The border war was 
disastrous for Eritrea. Though the 
regime in Asmara continues to be 
in utter denial, the cost of the war 
for Eritrea was disastrous not only in 
actual expenditure, but also in missed 
opportunities.
 In the few years of post-
independence remarkable progress 
was achieved. With dedication of 
Eritreans from all walks of life basic 
infrastructures and social services, 
such as health and education, were 
rehabilitated. Social reintegration 
programmes were implemented; many 
refugees and exiled, peasants, workers, 
business people and professionals 
alike, returned to the country and their 
home areas to start a new life in an 
independent country. 
The border war with Ethiopia 
reversed most of the gains. One of 
the most serious implications of the 
war was the attack on the nascent 
democratisation process. The people 
and the leadership took the war as 
a question of survival to which all 
human and material resources were 
committed. After decades of protracted 
war the modest infrastructure and 
economic fundamentals were 
practically destroyed. The Eritrean 
family as a fundamental economic and 
social unit was highly threatened by 
migration and constant mobility within 
the country in search of safety. 
The signing of the Algiers Peace 
Accord (2001) opened the way 
forward for reconstruction, and the 
democratisation process resumed. A 
number of legislative frameworks were 
promulgated, including the Political 
Party Act and the Press Law, with the 
purpose of introducing and regulating 
political plurality and the opening of 
private print media, respectively. At 
the same time, key military generals 
and government ministers asked for a 
party congress to be convened for the 
sole purpose of taking stock of the war. 
However, the request landed on deaf 
ears. The president refused to convene 
the congress. Instead the government-
controlled public media waged a smear 
campaign against the top officials and 
military commanders accusing them 
of exhibiting ‘defeatist’ positions. In 
an unprecedented manner more and 
more top officials came out in the 
private print press to give their own 
accounts on the governance challenges 
that country was facing. 
As the world was still in the state of 
shock as the result of the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United 
States, the security services moved 
swiftly and arrested 13 top army 
generals and government officials and 
journalists on September 18, 2001. 
Ever since, these officials, all leaders 
of the liberation struggle, remain in 
prisons in obscure places. They were 
never charged in a court of law. It is 
rumoured that many of them have 
since died in prison.
The catastrophe of 18 September 
was indeed a triumph for the 
authoritarian tendency that has shaped 
the political culture of EPLF all along. 
Violence was always justified as a 
means to a political end. This is not 
only due to the nature of the struggle 
– armed struggle, but also due to 
the purpose violence served in the 
internal power struggle within EPLF. 
Though there were statutory structures, 
their functions were closely directed 
and controlled by a highly secretive 
political party which was in command 
of all political direction and decisions 
of the movement. Shielded by its 
secrecy the party took no responsibility 
and accountability for any things that 
happened in the movement. This gave 
those in control of the secretive party, 
especially the then First Secretary 
Issaias Afewerki, a free hand to abuse 
the party for his own political ambition. 
Persecution, disappearance and extra-
judicial killings of presumed opponents 
were common within EPLF. Eventually, 
the secret party became a personal 
instrument of the first secretary. 
Having accomplished its purpose, 
the secret party was dissolved at a 
secret meeting of its central committee 
held in January 1993. No structure was 
officially announced to take up the role 
played by the secret party. However, 
a new clique around the president 
evolved, and this increasingly became 
highly dominant over the body politics 
of the country. The evident legacy of 
the secret party was a deep-seated 
fear among the rank and file of the 
movement for an ‘invisible’ hand of 
those in power. After independence, 
the fear eventually took root in the 
whole society as critical voices were 
brutally silenced. The violent action 
and human rights abuses were justified 
through nationalist propaganda. The 
violent suppression of protest by war-
disabled who asked for better living 
conditions in 1992; the persecution of 
some Muslims and other Christians as 
well as journalists attests to this. Banal 
‘nationalist’ justification was given by 
the government to these serious human 
rights atrocities that went without 
serious objection from the people or 
any other segment of the society. 
The constitution-making and 
other reform processes started to 
incrementally challenge the established 
political culture. With a determined 
outcome, namely a more democratic 
and relatively open political 
dispensation, it was quite evident that 
Since 2001 the 
national assembly 
as well as the party 
statutory structures, 
such as the Congress, 
the Central Committee 
and the Executive 
Committee, have not 
been convened.
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the various human rights violations and 
other mal-governance practices would 
have to be accounted for. Furthermore, 
the constitution would have allowed 
credible and transparent elections to 
legitimise the holding of state power. 
To prevent the emergence of such 
a political environment in the country, 
the border war could be seen as a 
good opportunity to preserve the status 
quo that is characterised by one-man 
authoritarian rule. The first targets were 
nascent state institutions the courts, the 
statutory structures of the party, the 
national assembly and the ministries. 
Establishing Special Military Courts 
run by military persons with no legal 
knowledge to examine legal cases was 
a deliberate move by the President to 
undermine the courts and obliterate 
the justice system of the country. Since 
2001 the national assembly as well as 
the party statutory structures, such as 
the Congress, the Central Committee 
and the Executive Committee, have not 
been convened. Decisions and actions 
taken by the government, rather by the 
President, have never been a result of 
deliberation and/or subjected to review 
by these national and party structures. 
This gave the President absolute 
power over national matters. 
Furthermore, the absence of a national 
budget approved by the national 
assembly is a clear indication of a 
political system at play which is totally 
devoid of any form of accountability 
and transparency in the allocation 
and utilisation of national resources. 
Ministries have no budget; they have to 
request resources from the presidency 
for every initiative they intend to 
undertake. The approval is at the 
discretion of the president. 
Moreover, the government has 
never declared the revenues gained 
from gold, other mining ventures or 
general taxes. In fact, under the disguise 
of the party a number of companies 
and business ventures were set up; 
these now operate within the country 
without paying any taxes or import 
duties. These companies dominate 
all sectors of the economy at the 
expense of Eritrean entrepreneurship. 
Some companies also have operations 
outside the country, for example in 
Uganda and South Sudan, which are 
fronted by conspicuous individuals. 
Neither the party nor the national 
treasury has control of the income of 
these ‘mafia’ type operations. 
As recent reports from agencies 
working in global transparency suggest, 
hundreds millions of dollars have 
been deposited in Swiss banks by 
conspicuous individuals from Eritrea 
in the last few years. These individuals 
consist of the president and people 
close to him.
Some analysts equate the prevailing 
system in Eritrea to the general 
phenomenon of post-liberation political 
developments. Algeria, Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique and Angola are often 
mentioned as comparable cases. 
Though these cases may share certain 
similarities with Eritrea, the Eritrean 
situation is unique. In the Eritrean case 
the state and party structures were 
sacrificed for the absolute personal 
power of the president, whereas in the 
other post-liberation cases the parties 
and the state structures are the sources 
of a legitimate power. 
Moreover, militarisation has been 
employed in Eritrea as a strategy 
for gaining total control over the 
society. The national military service 
literally put every able-bodied citizen 
under military structures through 
which the government gains  total 
control, not only on an individual’s 
physical whereabouts, but also his/
her physiological and emotional being. 
Unique to the regime in Eritrea is also 
its deep-seated hate for economic 
self-reliance amongst its citizens, for 
education and for intellectuals. The 
youth in particular have been the 
primary victims of this. Kept for years, 
if not decades, in military service the 
youth are denied a proper education 
that would enable them to acquire 
necessary skills. The only university in 
the country has remained closed for the 
last thirteen years for no other reason 
than the protests by students objecting 
to the abuse of military service by the 
regime.  
As part of its aggrandisement 
project in the region, the regime has 
been harbouring a number of armed 
rebels whose maintenance – their 
recruitment, and arming and financing 
their cross-border operations – do 
not come cheap to the poor country. 
According to intelligence information, 
it is claimed that the various opposition 
groups, mainly Ethiopian armed 
groups, are said to have between 
30 000 and 50 000 armed members. 
This is in addition to the relatively big 
size of the army – more than a third of 
Eritreans still living in the country are 
in one way or another members of the 
Eritrean army. 
The government justifies the high-
level militarisation by pointing to 
the unresolved border conflict with 
Ethiopia. Ethiopia said that it accepted 
the verdict of the Eritrean-Ethiopian 
Border Commission which handed 
the symbolic town of Badme to 
Eritrea. However, Ethiopia refused to 
implement the Border Commission’s 
decisions arguing that it wants political 
negotiations on the matter. Ethiopia 
continues to occupy sovereign 
Eritrean territory and this situation has 
contributed to the continuing no-war/ 
no-peace situation for the last 13 years. 
The situation seems to help the regime 
in Asmara to continue drumming its 
pseudo-nationalist rhetoric, using it as 
a pretext to hold the country and its 
people to ransom. Indeed so great is 
the suspicion among some Eritreans 
about Ethiopia that it makes them 
unwillingly sympathise with the regime 
on this point. If Ethiopia were willing 
to implement the Border Commission’s 
decision it would undermine the 
regime’s spurious nationalist rhetoric, 
and thereby further isolate it internally. 
A Clique in Power and a Possible 
Scenario
Outside observers often have 
difficulty in understanding the system in 
operation in Eritrea. While the official 
cabinet and a party structure are in 
place, the actual power of decision 
making, allocation of resources and 
taking action are in the hands of a clique 
with a highly amorphous structure with 
constant changes of its members. The 
permanent feature of the clique is 
President Issaias Afwerki. He is at its 
centre and steers its highly informal 
and secretive operations. For the last 
few years, the head of finance of the 
party Hagos Gebrihiwet and the head 
of political affairs of the party Yemane 
Gebreab have managed to remain 
members of the clique. Some generals 
of the army come in and out of the circle 
T H E  T H I N K E R66
AFRICA
time and again. The head of the secret 
service Abraha Kassa, around whom 
there are another bunch of individuals, 
remains loyal to the president. The 
clique controls the finance of the 
country, including the revenues from 
the gold and other minerals as well 
as the formal and informal business 
ventures; it also controls a well-financed 
secret service operating within the army 
and the civilian population within and 
outside the country. 
For some time the clique managed 
to sway the majority of Eritreans 
under the disguise of nationalism. As 
its human rights abuses and brutality 
has surfaced, its major instrument has 
become brute violence. The culture 
of impunity created by the clique is 
such that even lower level army and 
secret service officials have a free hand 
to imprison, torture and kill anyone 
they want. Extra-judicial executions, 
torture and imprisonment of young 
national service members is a common 
practice in the army. Army officials can 
execute any of their members for any 
offence. There is a total absence of 
accountability. 
Corruption is deeply imbedded 
in the system. As long as officials 
demonstrate loyalty to the President, 
they have a free hand to plunder state 
resources and extort money from 
citizens, especially business people, in 
exchange for protection. As the report 
of the UN Monitoring Group on Eritrea 
and Somalia attested, some top army 
officials close to the president are said 
to be masterminding human trafficking 
and arms trade in the region. 
This deliberately created situation 
serves the clique in power well as it puts 
senior officials and army officers in a 
highly compromised position, making 
it unlikely that they will ask questions 
on issues of national importance. 
Consequently, the system is a closely-knit 
web of personal interests. One’s survival 
in the system is entirely dependent on 
one’s ability to demonstrate total loyalty 
to the president. 
At some point such oppressive 
systems become unsustainable. 
Currently, the clique seems to have 
reached that level. The centre does 
not hold any longer. Many officials 
continue to abandon the regime, 
either because they fall out of grace, or 
just listen to their conscience. In fact, 
intelligence reports say that the clique 
is increasingly relying on Ethiopian 
armed opposition groups inside Eritrea 
for its security. The sentiment and 
discontent with the majority members 
of the Eritrean army is quite clear as 
the army mutiny of January 2013 and 
many other protests indicated. 
Conflict between the Eritrean 
army and the Ethiopian armed groups 
whose survival is closely linked to the 
survival of the clique is inevitable. 
Such a development would be likely 
to create a power vacuum rendering 
Eritrea a failed state. For legitimate 
and non-legitimate reasons this would 
invite the intervention of neighbouring 
states, especially that of Ethiopia and 
the Sudan. In addition, the likelihood 
of radical terrorist groups finding 
a presence in Eritrea is high if the 
geographical proximity to Yemen is 
taken into consideration. There are a 
number of consequences that could 
emanate  from such a scenario:
• Yemen in civil war combined with 
the absence of a central government 
in Eritrea would make the Red Sea 
basin and Bab el Mendeb highly 
insecure places; this would seriously 
jeopardise the security of naval 
transport and international trade;
• The civil war in Somalia and 
South Sudan combined with 
internal insecurity in Eritrea would 
exacerbate the already precarious 
security situation and instability in 
the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia, as the 
headquarters of the African Union 
Commission would not be spared 
from the consequences.
• The humanitarian situation would 
worsen and put neighbouring states 
under extreme socio-economic 
and political pressure, leading to 
an accelerated exodus of Eritreans, 
Sudanese, Somalis and Ethiopians 
to Europe in search of security and 
a better life. 
This scenario would indeed 
represent a movement in the opposite 
direction from the 2063 vision of the 
African Union. 
In the words of the SADC Council 
of NGOs, ”It is highly worrying that 
African leaders and the African 
Union have not taken any substantial 
measures to address and respond to 
the growing humanitarian crisis in the 
country, which has spilled over to 
neighbouring countries and beyond. 
The UNHRC COI has characterised 
the crisis in Eritrea constituting crimes 
against humanity, and that it is the 
threatening regional and international 
peace and security.”
As a primary agent of continental 
peace and security, the African Union 
is duty-bound to seize the momentum 
and be proactive to prevent the above 
scenario from occurring. The AU 
Commission must urgently undertake a 
fact-finding mission to Eritrea to assess 
the situation at first hand. It is important 
that the mission demands free and open 
access to citizens and organisations, 
including political prisoners, as well as 
Eritreans in the diaspora. It must impress 
upon the Eritrean government the need 
to change and improve the human 
rights situation in the country by: 
• unconditionally releasing political 
prisoners; 
• demobilising members of the 
national service who have served 
longer than the legally stipulated 
period with adequate compensation 
for the service rendered; 
• guarantee the citizens the right to 
move freely within and outside the 
country; and
• allow independent media to 
operate. 
At the same time, as the guarantor 
of the Algiers Peace Accord, the 
AU should insist that Ethiopia fully 
accept the Algiers Peace Accord and 
implement the Border Commission’s 
decision without further delay. The AU 
has to declare Eritrea as a country in 
crisis requiring AU intervention; hence, 
make Eritrea an agenda point of the AU 
Peace and Security Commission. The 
AU should put forward an engagement 
plan with the government of Eritrea 
and also with organised Eritreans in the 
diaspora. 
Through the implementation of such 
a process the AU can assist Eritreans to 
find a common ground for dialogue on 
the future of their country. The ultimate 
purpose of the national dialogue 
process must be the establishment of a 
constitutional and democratic political 
dispensation in the country in support 
of peace and security in Eritrea and the 
whole region. ■
